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The Attorney-Client Privilege and (he Corporate Client: 
Where Do We Go After Upjohn? 
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage full 
and frank communication between clients and their attorneys.1 The 
increased communication which presumably results from the privi-
lege2 enables attorneys to render better legal advice, ostensibly in-
creasing compliance with the law and improving the administration 
of justice.3 Once litigation arises, however, the privilege removes 
1. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Trammel v. United States, 445 
U.S. 40, 51 (1980); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,403 (1976); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 
U.S. 464, 470 (1888). 
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the evidentiary privileges, dating back to at 
least the sixteenth century. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290, at 542-43 (McNaughton rev. 
1961) [hereinafter cited as J. WIGMORE]. see also Gergacr.,Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege, 
37 Bus. LAW. 461,473 (1982) (suggesting that the privilege originated with the Romans); see 
generally Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 
1061, 1070 (1978) (suggesting that the history of privilege provides no authority for construing 
the privilege broadly); Gardner, A Re-evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 VILL. L. 
REV. 279, 286-304 (1963). Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer 
and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 489 (1928). 
The justification for the privilege has changed over time. Originally, the privilege was 
designed to preserve "the oath and honor of the attorney." The privilege belonged to the 
attorney, not the client. Only the attorney could waive the privilege because it was his honor 
that was at stake. In addition, the privilege terminated at the conclusion of the particular 
client's litigation. See J. WIGMORE, supra at 543-45. 
The "oath of honor'' jusitification was discarded in the late 1700s. Today, the privilege 
belongs to the client. It exists independently of any litigation, and can only be waived by the 
client. J. WIGMORE, supra at 544-45. Moreover, if the client has not waived the privilege, the 
attorney must assert the privilege upon any attempt to require him to testify about confidential 
conversations or to produce confidential documents. This duty is a "matter of profesional re-
sponsibility in preventing the policy of the law from being violated." Schwimmer v. United 
States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir. 1956); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI· 
BILITY Canon 4 ("A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client"). 
2. While it is presumed that the privilege encourages communications between clients and 
attorneys, that presumption has not been verified empirically. See, e.g., Kobak, The Uneven 
Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REV. 
339, 339 (1972); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporation in Shareholder Litiga-
tion, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 306 (1977) ("[N]o empirical data is available which will accu-
rately demonstrate whether the privilege actually encourages communications between 
attorneys and their clients.") (footnote omitted). The only empirical study conducted to date 
produced inconclusive results. See Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other 
Professionals: Its Implications far the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 
1262 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Yale Note] (55 of 108 laymen questioned would be less likely 
to provide information to counsel if the privilege were abolished, 37 would not be less likely, 
and 16 did not know). 
Nevertheless, Note, Attorney-Client Privilege For Corporate Clients: The Control Group 
Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424, 427-29 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note] argues that the 
privilege may not increase communications between corporate clients and their attorneys. 
While this proposition may in fact be true, courts will probably not challenge this long held 
assumption. See note 5 i,ifra. 
3. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). The Upjohn Court stated that 
the privilege "promote[s] broader public interests in the observance of law and administration 
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these communications from the discovery process, thereby impeding 
the search for the truth.4 Because the privilege has clear costs and 
largely speculative benefits, courts and commentators argue for the 
narrowest possible construction of the privilege that is "consistent 
with the logic of its principle."5 
In applying the privilege to individual clients, the courts have 
generally struck a balance between these competing interests by ap-
plying Professor Wigmore's eight part formulation of the privilege.6 
of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and 
that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer being fully informed by the client." 
449 U.S. at 389. See McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 87, at 175 (E. 
Cleary 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK]; Miller, The Challenges lo the Allorney-
Clienl Privilege, 49 VA. L. REV. 262, 268-70 (1963) (attorneys can give more forthright advice, 
thereby reducing the possibility of misleading clients). Of course, both clients and attorneys 
benefit from the privilege. Clients benefit from being able to disclose information to attorneys 
without fear of having the information subject to discovery; attorneys benefit from being fully 
informed of their client's affairs. See Gergacz, supra note I, at 464-68. 
4. J. WIGMORE,supra note I,§ 2291, at 554. (The privilege is "an obstacle to the investiga-
tion of the truth."). The privilege also contravenes the modern theory of discovery that "par-
ties ••• [should] obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial." 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,500 (1947); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323,331 (1950) 
("[T]he public ... has a right to [know] every man's evidence."). See generally 8 C. WRIGHT 
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2001 (1970). 
5. J. WIGMORE, supra note I, § 2291, at 554 (footnote omitted). A strong argument can be 
made that the privilege should not exist. According to Dean Wigmore, one fundamental con-
dition for establishing a privilege is that "[t]he injury that would inure to the relation by the 
disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the cor• 
rect disposal of litigation." J. WIGMORE, supra note I, § 2285, at 527 (emphasis in original). 
The Model Code of Evidence accepts the common perception that this condition is satisfied, 
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 210 Comment a (1942), but many commentators argue that 
the issue is unresolved. J. WIGMORE, supra note I, § 2285, at 528; see, e.g., Weissenberger, 
Toward Precision in the Application of the Allorney-Clienl Privilege for Corporations, 65 lo WA L. 
REV. 899, 899 (1980) ("The most that is usually said on behalf of the privilege is that, without 
it, the rendition oflegal services would be virtually impossible.") (footnote omitted); Kobak, 
supra note 2, at 339; Harvard Note, supra note 2, at 425 "[T]here is some reason to doubt 
whether the privilege even achieves the benefits claimed ofit.") (footnote omitted); Note, Evi-
dence - Privileged Communications - The Allorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Selling: 
A Suggested Approach, 69 MICH. L. REV. 360, 364 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Michigan Note] 
("[l]t is difficult - if not impossible - to determine whether the privilege does in fact promote 
freedom of consultation and encourage full disclosure of material information .••• "); Yale 
Note, supra note 2, at 1236-46 (1962) (after discussing costs and benefits of the privilege, the 
Note concludes that bar and bench would vigorously oppose the elimination or alteration of 
the privilege and therefore change "is unlikely."). 
Nevertheless, almost no one seriously advocates abolishing the privilege. See Chirac v. 
Reinicker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 280, 294 (1826) (privilege.is "indispensable for the purposes of 
private justice"); compare McCORMICK, supra note 3, at 176 (society would be "outraged" at 
any attempt to abolish the privilege) and Hazard, supra note I, at 1062 ("[T]he issue concern• 
ing the attorney-client privilege is not whether it should exist, but precisely what its terms 
should be."); with Gardner, A Personal Privilege for Communications of Corporate Clients -
Paradox or Public Policy?, 40 U. DET. L.J. 299,309, 354 (1963) ("[N]o well-reasoned argument 
jusitifies the extension of the privilege to corporations.") and Radin, supra note I, (questioning 
the policy reasons behind the privilege). 
6. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); United States v. Osborn, 561 
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Applying the privilege to corporatiqns7 has proven more problematic 
because corporations can request legal advice or make decisions 
based on that advice only through their agents. 8 In addition, unlike 
most individuals, corporations-particularly large ones-continu-
ously consult attorneys,9 which creates the intolerable possiblity of 
F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); Colton v. 
United States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963). 
Under Dean Wigmore's standard, a communication is privileged if the following condi-
tions are satisfied. 
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in his 
capacity as such, (3) the communication relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence 
(SJ by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by 
himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except if the protection be waived. 
J. WIGMOR.E, supra note 1, § 2292, at 554. 
7. Originally, courts assumed that the privilege applied to communications from corporate 
clients. See, e.g., Schwimmer v. United States 232 F.2d 855, 863-64 (8th Cir. 1956); Cole v. 
Hughes Tool Co., 215 F.2d 924, 930-31 (10th Cir. 1954); Belanger v. Alton Box Bd. Co., 180 
F.2d 87, 93-94 (7th Cir. 1950). One district court challenged this assumption, holding that the 
privilege did not apply to corporate communications. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas 
Assn., 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. lll. 1962), qffd on rehearing, 209 F. Supp. 321 (1962). However, 
the decision was reversed on appeal. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Assn. 320 F.2d 
314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). 
In Upjohn, the Supreme Court "assumed that the privilege applies when the client is a 
corporation." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981) (citing United States v. 
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318,336 (1915), where the Court declared: "The desira-
bility of protecting confidential communications between attorney and client as a matter of 
public policy is too well known ... to need extended comment now."); Bell v. Maryland, 378 
U.S. 226,263 (1964) (appendix 1 to opinion of Douglas, J.) (concurring opinion) ("A corpora-
tion, like any other client, is entitled to the attorney-client privilege."); Simon, The Attorney-
Client Privilege As Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953, 955 (1956) ("[l]four laws tend to 
be good, good legal advice should benefit society as well as General Motors."). But see Gard-
ner, supra note 5, at 354. 
8. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) 
("A corporation is an artificial entity, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation 
oflaw."); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596,608 (8th Cir. 1977) (en bane) ("[A] 
corporation can speak or hear only through its ... agents .... "); 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BER-
GER., WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1J 503(b)[04], at 503-41 to 44 (1981) [hereinafter cited as WEIN-
STEIN]; Rosenfeld, The Traniformation of the Attorney-Client Privilege: In Search of an 
Ideological Reconciliation of Individualism, The Adversary System, and the Corporate Client's 
SEC Disclosure Obligations, 33 HASTINGS L.J.495, 516 (1982); Simon, supra note 7, at 956 ("A 
corporation can only speak through its representatives."); Weissenberger, supra note 5, at 905; 
Michigan Note, supra note 5, at 374 (corporations have "decision makers" and ''givers of i,ifor-
mation") (emphasis in original). 
9. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981) ("In light of the vast and compli-
cated array of regulatory legislation confronting the modem corporation, corporations, unlike 
individuals, 'constantly go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law.'") (quoting Burnham, 
The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 Bus. LAW. 901, 913 (1969)). See, e.g., 
Gergacz, supra note 1, at 478 ("corporations have a regular need for legal advice"); Weis-
senberger, supra note 5, at 902 ("[c]orporations tend to have more continuing interaction with 
lawyers than do natural persons."); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege - Ident!fying the Cor-
porate Client, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1307 (1980) ("integral role of attorneys in the daily 
function of corporations") (footnote omitted). Corporate clients also rely on attorneys for 
business advice, which enlarges the potential zone of silence. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 7, at 
969 ("lawyers .•• participate in business decisions"); Weissenberger, supra note 5, at 902 
(need "incisive test for separating legal from nonlegal communications, [or else] •.. the zone 
of silence ... may become abusively large.") (footnote omitted). See generally Yale Note, 
supra note 2. The court's difficulty in separating legal advice from business advice is vividly 
illustrated in cases where an attorney assisted with the preparation of a tax return. Compare 
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insulating from discovery all information provided attorneys unless 
the privilege is narrowly applied. 10 Given the conceptual difficulty 
of developing a standard that provides corporations with the same 
protection as that afforded individuals, while preventing corporate 
attorneys from becoming repositories of undiscoverable information, 
it is not surprising that courts have formulated several different stan-
dards for applying the attorney-client privilege to corporate 
communications. 11 
In Upjohn v. United States, 12 the Supreme Court rejected one of 
Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849, 857 (8th Cir. 1966) (lawyer who prepared tax returns 
acted as a mere scrivener; therefore communications to him not privileged) wit/1 Colton v. 
United States, 306 F.2d 633,639 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963) (communica-
tions during preparation of tax returns privileged). 
IO. Simon, supra note 7, at 955-56 originally phrased this potential abuse as the "zone of 
silence": 
Where corporations are involved, with their large numbers of agents, masses of docu-
ments, and frequent dealings with lawyers, the zone of silence grows large. Few judges -
or legislators either, for that matter - would long tolerate any common law privilege that 
allowed corporations to insulate all their activities by discussing them with legal advisers. 
Simon's ''zone of silence" is not as ominous as it would first appear. See notes 90-98 and 
accompanying text. 
11. Prior to the Upjohn decision, federal courts used numerous different standards to deter-
mine whether the privilege applies to a particular corporate communication. This Note dis-
cusses four of those tests: the control group test, the subject matter test, the modified subject 
matter test, and the Ampicillin test. The first three tests are discussed in detail in this Note. 
See notes 12-18, 27-41, 42-14infra and accompanying text. For a discussion ofAmpicillin, see 
note 60 infra. 
12. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). In Upjohn, the drug manufacturer's counsel conducted an inter-
nal investigation concerning payments to foreign government officials by one of its subsidiar-
ies. Managers of the foreign operations completed questionnaires and several employees were 
interviewed. Upon completion of the investigation, Upjohn disclosed several questionable 
payments to the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Commission's Voluntary Dis-
closure Program. The Internal Revenue Service then began a criminal investigation into the 
tax consequences of the payments and demanded to see the questionnaires and interview 
notes. Upjohn claimed they were protected by the attorney-client privilege and by the work-
product doctrine. See note 28 infra for a discussion of the work-product doctrine. 
Investigations of corporate behavior such as illegal payments, commercial bribery, and 
other questionable payments have become quite common since the duty to disclose such be-
havior was imposed by the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 
95-213, §§ 101-104, 91 Stat. 1494 (1980) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78q(b), 78ff(a) (1976)). See 
generally Block & Barton, Internal Corporate Investigations: Maintaining the Confidentiality ef 
a Corporate Client's Communications with Investigative Counsel, 35 Bus. LAW. 5, 6 (1979). 
Prior to passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Commission introduced the Volun-
tary Disclosure Program in 1976 to allow corporations to disclose illegal or questionable pay-
ment voluntarily and avoid the SEC's enforcement mechanism. See generally (1975-1976 
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 80,600. 
Courts are divided on whether such disclosures themselves constitute a waiver of the privi-
lege and the issue was not resolved in Upjohn. Some courts have held that such disclosure 
waives the attorney-client privilege, see, e.g., In re Weiss, 596 F.2d I 185, 1186 (4th Cir. 1979) 
(grand jury proceedings); SEC v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 453 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D.D.C. 1978), 
qjfd, 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980) (SEC proceedings), while 
others have held that, in the interest of fostering disclosure, such disclosures do not waive the 
privilege as to other parties seeking the same documents. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. 
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 61 I (8th Cir. 1977) (en bane); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 
13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368, 373 (E.D. Wis. 1979). The Court of Appeals in Upjohn adopted a 
middle position: "The ... voluntary disclosures ... amount to a waiver of the privilege only 
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the more popular standards developed by the lower courts - the 
control group test. Under that test, the privilege only extends to 
communications made by those employees "who play a substantial 
role in deciding and directing the corporation's response to the legal 
advice given."13 The test arguably offered a reasonable solution to 
the unique problems posed by corporate clients because it en-
couraged corporate officials possessing decision-making power to 
communicate with counsel, but prevented corporations from creating 
a broad "zone of silence" by funnelling communications from lower-
level employees to counsel.14 
with respect to the facts actually disclosed." United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 
n.12 (6th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court did not address the waiver issue in Upjohn, leaving 
one to wonder whether the Sixth Circuit's approach is still viable. See Comment, Upjohn Co. 
v. United States: A Functional Expansion of the Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege, 67 IOWA 
L. REV. 161, 176 n.117 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Iowa Comment] (suggesting that the Sixth 
Circuit's approach "may well [have] surviv[ed] intact"); Compare Nath, Upjohn: A New Pre-
scription for the Attorney- Client Privilege and Work Product .Defenses in Administrative Inves-
tigations, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 58-65 (arguing that disclosure to the SEC should constitute a 
waiver); with Comment, Corporate Se!f-Investigations Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
47 U. CHI. L. REV. 803, 816-23 (1980) (arguing that the courts should either adopt the subject 
matter test or expand the self-investigative privilege for disclosure made pursuant to the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act). 
13. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir. 1979) (footnote omitted), 
revd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
The control group test was first announced in Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. 
Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). Judge Kirkpatrick, 
in an often quoted paragraph, declared: 
Keeping in mind that the question is, is it the corporation which is seeking the lawyer's 
advice when the asserted privileged communication is made?, the most satisfactory solu-
tion, I think, is that if the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may 
be, is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any 
action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if he is an 
authorized member of a body or group which has that authority, then, in effect, he is (or 
personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege 
would apply. 
210 F. Supp. at 485. 
Prior to the Upjohn decision, the control group test was followed by the Third, Sixth, and 
Tenth Circuits, as well as various District Courts. See, e.g., United States v. Amerada Hess 
Corp., 619 F.2d 980 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1224-25 (6th 
Cir. 1979), revd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 
1979); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686,692 (10th Cir. 1968); Jarvis, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 84 F.R.D. 286, 291 (D. Colo. 1979); United States v. Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. 35, 42-43 (N.D. 
Tex. 1979); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 
400 (E.D. Va. 1975); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 35-36 (D. Md. 1974); 
United States v. International Bus. Mach. Co., 66 F.R.D. 206, 209-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Con-
goleum Indus., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 84 (E.D. Pa. 1969), '!lfd, 478 F.2d 1398 (3d 
Cir. 1973). 
14. See United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d at 1227;Accord Nath, supra note 12, at 52-
53; Harvard Note, supra note 2, at 429-32. q: Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 
F.2d at 485 (suggesting that control group test was necessary to avoid a conflict with Hickman 
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)). Several commentators disagree with the Westinghouse ration-
ale. See, e.g., Weissenberger, supra note 5, at 909 n.47; Weinschel, Corporate Employee Inter-
views and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L._REv. 873, 875 (1971) ("It does 
not follow from the Hickman decision that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to 
communications by [noncontrol group] employees to corporate attorneys."). See note 28 i'!fra. 
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Notwithstanding these benefits, the Upjohn court rejected the 
control group test, reasoning that its narrow scope frustrated the pur-
poses of the privilege in three respects. First, the test inhibited the 
rendering of sound legal advice by denying the privih;ge to commu-
nications from middle- and lower-level employees15 even though 
In Upjohn, a number of the communications from company employees to counsel would 
not have been privileged because the employees were not members of the control group. How-
ever, the Sixth Circuit, while virtually conceding that senior corporate officials are control 
group members, declined to determine which other employees were members of the control 
group, and remanded the case to the district court. 600 F.2d at 1227-28. 
IS. 449 U.S. at 391-92;see, e.g., Diversified lnaus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 608-09 
(8th Cir. 1977) (en bane) (quoting Weinschel, supra note 14, at 876); Michigan Note, supra 
note 5, at 374. 
This view, however, is not without its skeptics. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation 
599 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1979); Nath, supra note 12, at 41-44. These critics basically argue 
that fear of reprisal from superiors or loyalty to the corporation motivates lower-level employ-
ees to communicate with counsel. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F,2d at 1236 
("[N]on-control-group employees have little reason not to relate information to corporate 
counsel, especially where a superior has instructed them to do so,"); Nath, supra note 12, at 43 
(''The dominant impetus is, and remains the employee's loyalty to this corporation."), These 
critics reason that the employee makes the communication at his own risk because the corpora-
tion, acting through its control group, can waive the privilege, thereby exposing the lower-level 
employee to prosecution. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 611 n.S; if. 
Note, Permian Corporation v. United States and the Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporations: 
Unjust{lied Severity on the Issue of Waiver, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 223 (1982) (discussing corporate 
waiver in the context of disclosures to regulatory agencies). Because the privilege belongs to 
the corporation, the employee cannot claim the privilege ifhe is prosecuted. In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, Detroit, Mich., August 1977, 434 F. Supp. 648, 650 (E.D. Mich. 1977), o/fd., 570 
F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). Thus, these authorities conclude that the only possible justification for the 
employee's communication is his duty to the corporation. Accordingly, the privilege should 
not extend to such communications because they will be made in the absence of the privilege, 
While this argument demands further analysis by the courts and commentators, several 
responses may be offered in defense of a test that extends the privilege to communications of 
lower-level employees. First, the argument for denying the privilege to lower-level employees 
simply replaces the assumption that the privilege encourages communication with another as-
sumption - that it is really the employee's duty to the corporation that is the impetus for 
disclosure, without offering any evidence to support such an assumption. Second, even though 
in theory the control group can waive the privilege, this threat of waiver may be more ap-
parant than real. If the lower-level employee is reasonably assured that the communication 
will be privileged and that the privilege will not be waived, he will be more willing to disclose 
information to counsel even when that information may be incriminating. 
More fundamentally, the employee's perception of what loyalty to the corporation or the 
fear of reprisal dictates in a particular situation may depend on the availability of the privilege. 
If the corporation cannot assert the privilege regarding communications from lower-level em-
ployees, the discovery of which may dramatically increase the risk that the corporation will 
incur civil or criminal liability, the corporation will have a very strong incentive to discourage 
such self-initiated reports. Would, for example, the management of Upjohn have initiated a 
major internal investigation with the knowledge that its fruits would be discovered by the 
government? The vigor with which the corporation fought discovery suggests that it would not, 
And if a corporation would not institute an investigation because of the apprehension that the 
record developed internally might become subject to discovery, that same apprehension proba-
bly suffices to foster a corporate environment hostile to employee reports of corporate wrong-
doing. The importance of such an environment should not be under-emphasized: 
Organizational processes, then, create an internal moral and intellectual world in which 
the individual identifies with the organization and the organization's goals. The survival 
of one becomes linked to the survival of the other, and a normative environment evolves 
that, given difficulty in attaining organizational goals, encourages illegal behavior to at-
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they often possess the information most needed by counsel to pro-
vide sound legal advice. I6 Second, the test frustrated attorneys' ef-
forts at ensuring compliance with the law by denying the privilege to 
communications from attorneys to lower level employees who often 
are responsible for implementing corporate policy. I7 Third, the un-
certainty caused by varying definitions of "control group" inhibited 
communications between corporate officials and attorneys.Is 
tain those goals. But some finer distinctions must be made. Not all agents of an organiza-
tion will act illei;ally in the organization's behalf. The nature of the response - lawful or 
unlawful behavior -will be shaped by structural factors both internal and external to the 
organization. While organizations may experience structural tensions to violate, varia-
tions in subunit membership, position in the information system, and in rewards and pun-
ishments may undermine the organization's ability to unify the goals and actions of its 
members with its own goals and actions, producing either deviance or conformity to legal 
norms. 
Vaughan, Toward Understanding Unlawful Organizational Behavior, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1377, 
1391 (1982) (footnotes omitted). Conversely, if the privilege attaches to such self-initiated re-
ports of possible misconduct, the corporation has every incentive to encourage these inquiries. 
Such an environment, moreover, would indicate to employees that loyalty to the corporation 
dictates a willingness to report potential illegality, rather than to suppress it for fear of ultimate 
discovery by adversaries in litigation. Perhaps this contribution to internal policing does less 
to encourage compliance with the law than the expanded enforcement of liability that would 
follow the unconfined discovery of internal requests for legal advice. But as Upjoltn itself reaf-
firmed, the existence of the privilege in any form depends on the judgment that informed 
counsel can do more to secure obedience to law than can unlimited discovery. Given that 
corporate decision-makers confront some risk of liability even when their own investigations 
are not subject to discovery, the extension of this reasoning to the corporate context does not 
seem implausible. 
16. Nath and other critics have also suggested that the privilege does not encourage com-
munications between any corporate employees and attorneys. Nath argues that "potential ex-
posures to securities and tax law violations, derivative suits, charges of currency violations, and 
other independent business reasons [provide] the impetus" for investigation of questionable 
behavior. Nath, supra note 12, at 44. Thus, the communications had to take place, quite apart 
from the privilege. See Harvard Note, supra note 2, at 428-29 (in some situations, business 
reasons motivate communication to counsel); Note, The Attomey-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, 
Balancing and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 474-75 (1977) ("continuing 
desire of corporation to obtain legal advice" vitiates need for certainty in applying the privi-
lege.). 
Again, the fundamental flow of these arguments is that they replace one unverifiable as-
sumption with another. Moreover, the logical extension of these arguments is that the privi-
lege should not extend to individuals who conduct business in a sole proprietorship. Given 
prevailing authority, such a position is untenable. 
Moreover, the existence of independent incentives to investigate potential wrongdoing does 
not diminish the additional incentive provided by the privilege, especially when mediated 
through the corporate reaction to internal disclosures. Where the fear of liability inspires the 
internal investigation, the corporation may be especially hostile to learning the worst in discov-
erable form. Since the fear of litigation will arise independently of information subsequently 
obtained, the corporation will not lose its incentive to investigate because confirmation of this 
fear is not discoverable; even without internal disclosure, whatever prompted the corporate 
apprehension of suit or prosecution will suffice to encourage compliance with the law. The 
privilege thus may reinforce other incentives for self-regulation, while encouraging internal 
disclosure which otherwise might not occur. 
17. 449 U.S. at 392 (quoting Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 
I 164 (D.S.C. 1974)) ("After the lawyer forms his or her opinion, it is of no immediate benefit 
to the Chairman of the Board or the President. It must be given to the corporate personnel 
who will apply it."). 
18. 449 U.S. at 393 ("An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but re-
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Unfortunately, the Upjohn Court expressly declined to comment 
on the other formulations of the privilege developed by the lower 
courts. 19 Thus, except for the factors listed in the opinion, 20 the 
suits in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all."). 
Unpredictability was one of the reasons Upjohn filed for certiorari. See Petitioner's Brief for 
Certiorari at 10, Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) 
The courts had in fact employed a varying definition of "control group." Compare Con-
goleum Indus. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 83-8S (E.D. Pa. 1969) (Director of Research is not 
a control group member) with Hogan v. Zietz, 43 F.R.D. 308, 31S-16 (N.D. Okla. 1967), a.ffd. in 
part sub nom. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968) (Group leader in Research and 
Development Department is a control group member). See also Duplan Corp. v. Deering 
Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (D.S.C. 1974) (terms such as "manager," "officer," 
"representative" are insufficient to establish membership in control group); Philadelphia v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 48S (E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohibition denied 
sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 
943 (1963) (manager, executive, officer, "are not clearly defined terms."); WEINSTEIN, supra 
note 3, § S03(b)[04] at S03-46 (control group variable), and S03-48 ("superior" a variable 
term); Amicus Curiae Brief of ABA at S, Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) 
("[E)ach time there is a request for advice by a corporate client, [counsel] must first inquire 
into the position, status, and responsibility of the corporate employee making the 
request. . . ."). 
19. 449 U.S. at 396 ("[W]e decide only the case before us, and do not undertake to draft a 
set of rules which should govern challenges to investigatory subpoenas."). 
According to the court, a case-by-case approach is consistent with the spirit if not the letter 
of Federal Rule of Evidence SOI. 449 U.S. at 396-97. Chief Justice Burger strongly disagreed 
with this part of the opinion, arguing that the need for certainty warranted the articulation of a 
standard that would "afford guidance to corpotations, counsel. .. and federal courts.") 449 
U.S. at 402. 
While the majority's interpretation of the legislative history of rule SOI is not clearly erro-
neous, it appears equally plausible that Congress was looking to the courts to develop a uni-
form rule. First, given that one of the primary reasons for developing the Federal Rules of 
Evidence was to eliminate "uncertainties in the law of evidence and variations among the 
circuits," Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings on R.R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate), it would behoove the 
Court to adopt a standard that would be followed by all circuits. 
Second, the timing of the promulgation of rule SOI suggests that Congress wanted the 
courts to formulate a standard. Originally, the co=on law privileges were to be handled by 
promulgating thirteen distinct rules. One of those rules codified the control group test. How-
ever, after the Supreme Court affirmed the subject matter test, see note 27 infra, the Advisory 
Committee deleted the section on corporations. The House and Senate then disagreed on the 
treatment of privileges generally, and abandoned 12 rules in favor of rule SOI, a general propo-
sition that the law of privileges "shall be governed by the principles of the co=on law as they 
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience," 
See WEINSTEIN,supra note 8, f S03[01], f S03(b)[04], at S03-47. A reasonable interpretation of 
this sequence of events is that Congress wanted the courts to develop a test for applying the 
privilege to corporations. See 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 Cong. Rec. 40891 (1974) (remarks of 
Rep. Hungate) (The phrase "governed by the principles of the co=on law" was "intended to 
provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules or privilege on a case-by-case basis,") 
(emphasis added). 
Finally, one could argue that establishing a standard to which the facts of a particular case 
are applied does constitute an application of the privilege on a case-by-case basis. While en• 
couraging judicial flexibility and experiment in a new and difficult area of law may foster 
salutary ferment in the lower courts, the scope of the corporate attorney-client privilege is 
unlikely to benefit from further development absent additional Supreme Court guidance. The 
issue is at least as old as the Court's recognition of the privilege in a corporate context. See 
United States v. Louisville & N. R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (191S) (protecting confidential com• 
munications between coryx>rations and attorneys is desirable). The control group test was first 
articulated in Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 48S (E.D. Pa. 1962), 
mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d 
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Supreme Court placed no restrictions on the federal courts' discre-
tion either to choose among the alternative tests aheady developed 
or to formulate a totally new standard.21 Part I of this Note exam-
ines two of the more popular standards, the Seventh Circuit's "sub-
ject matter test"22 and the Eighth Circuit's "modified subject matter 
test"23 and concludes that neither approach is entirely consistent 
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). If twenty years of competition among the possi-
ble tests has not clarified the issues and the options, it seems most unlikely that further search-
ings by the lower courts will reveal a definitive answer. Indeed, the most recent "innovation" 
among the lower courts is the Illinois Supreme Court's decision to adopt the control group test. 
/ See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. 2d 103, 118-20, 432 N.E.2d 250, 257-58 
(1982). Given the costs of uncertainty, and the necessity of eventually adopting a standard (if 
only by rejecting erroneous formulations as they come, one by one, before the Court), the 
Chief Justice's concurrence advances a persuasive argument for significant clarification by the 
Supreme Court at the next opportunity. 
20. The Court listed several significant factors: (1) The communications were made by 
Upjohn employees at the direction of corporate superiors, (2) so that Upjohn could recieve 
legal advice from counsel; (3) the communications concerned matters within the scope of the 
employee's duties (4) which were not available from upper-level directors; (5) the employees 
were told the purpose of the communications; and (6) the communications were considered 
confidential when made and were not disseminated outside the corporation. 449 U.S. at 394. 
The Court's failure to explain the significance of these factors has engendered confusion 
among the courts and the commentators. See, e.g., Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Le-
may, 89 F.R.D. 410, 413-14 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (applying the six-factor test of Upjohn); In re 
LTV Sec. Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595,602 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("In Upjohn, the Court made clear 
that the . . . privilege applies to communications made by corporate employees . . . regardless 
of echelon .•.. "); SEC v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. 518 F. Supp. 675, 681 (D.D.C. 1981) 
("Upjohn v. United States did not articulate ... specific guidelines regarding corporation and 
the privilege as some had anticipated."); Gergacz, supra note l, at 511 ("The Court in Upjohn 
was not satisfied with the control group test, nor did it embrace the subject matter test. In-
stead, it ... applied ... an analysis of various factors .... "); Nath, supra note 12, at 54 
(Court adopted subject matter test); Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate 
Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. R.E.v. 443, 462 (1982) ("[T]he Court did not embrace the 
subject matter test or any of its modifications."); Iowa Comment, supra note 12, at 174-75 
(courts should use four of the Upjohn court's six factors); Comment, Corporate Attorney-Client 
Privilege: The Confusion Remains After Upjohn, 17 NEW ENG. L. R.E.v. 925, 943-44 (1982) 
(court adopted six-factor test, but "it is unclear whether each element" must be satisfied.). 
21. Even if a single test is adopted, total uniformity will not be achieved. In diversity suits, 
state rules of evidence apply. FED. R. Evw. 501 ("in civil actions and proceedings, with respect 
to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the 
privilege ... shall be determined in accordance with State law."). Ordinarily, federal law of 
privileges applies in federal questions cases, although theoretically state privilege law may 
control. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 8, ~ 501[02], at 501-20 to 21; cf. Kobak, supra note 2, at 
341-52 (arguing that federal courts should not develop a federal common law for the privilege, 
but rather should adopt the state law). 
In addition, state courts are not required to apply the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 
Stern,Attorney-Client Privelege: Supreme Court Repudiates the Control Group Test, 67 A.B.A. 
J. 1142 (1981). Most state courts have looked to Upjohn for guidance, see, e.g., Marriott Corp. 
v. American Academy of Psychotherapists, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 497 (1981), Leer v. Chicago, 
Milwaukee, S. P. & Pac. Ry., 308 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982); 
Macey v. Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc., 179 NJ. Super. 535 (1981). The Illinois Supreme Court 
has, however, repudiated Upjohn and applied the control group test. See Consolidation Coal 
Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co. 89 Ill. 2d 103, 116-20, 432 N.E.2d 250, 256-58 (1982). Thus, even if 
one standard were adopted for federal courts, total uniformity would still not be achieved. 
22. See notes 27-41 infra and accompanying text. 
23. See notes 42-74 infra and accompanying text. 
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with the purposes of the privilege. Part II argues that the courts 
should adopt the Eighth Circuit's test with two further modifications. 
One revision is but a demand for clarification and consistency: the 
courts should explicitly adopt Dean Wigmore's legal advice require-
ment for corporate clients. 24 The other modification is more radical: 
the command requirement should be eliminated. Under this ap-
proach, every employee may stand in the position of the client for 
purposes of the privilege.25 The Note argues that these modifications 
will better enable attorneys to provide sound legal advice, assist at-
torneys in ensuring that corporations comply with the law, and pre-
vent attorneys from becoming repositories of undiscoverable 
information. 26 
l. PRESENT STANDARDS AND THEIR WEAKNESSES 
A. The Subject Matter Test 
Ten years prior to Upjohn, the Seventh Circuit, in Harper & Row 
Publishers Inc. v . .Decker,21 adopted a formulation of the privilege 
that is much broader than the control group test: The privilege ap-
plies to communications from any employee to an attorney if "the 
employee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors 
in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the at-
torney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the 
communication is the performance by the employee of the duties of 
his employment."28 The court rejected the control group test be-
24. The modified subject matter test allows the corporation to satisfy itsprimafacie burden 
on the legal advice requirement by showing that the communication was made to an attorney. 
See notes 48-65 iefra and accompanying text. 
25. Under the modified subject matter test, lower- and middle-level employees must speak 
to counsel at the direction of superiors before their communications are privileged. See notes 
51-14 iefra and accompanying text. 
26. See Part II, iefra. 
27. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), a.ffd per curiam by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 
(1971). 
28. 423 F.2d at 491-92. 
Because the court found the subject matter of the communication to be within the em-
ployee's scope of employment, it did not decide whether the privilege should attach to em-
ployee communications that discuss matters the employee observed as a witness. 423 F.2d at 
491. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1946), probably prevents the privilege from applying in 
such a situation. In Hickman, several crew members of a tugboat were killed in an accident. 
The tugboat company's attorney interviewed surviving crew members. The plaintiffs in the 
suit against the tugboat company sought discovery of these documents. The defendant's lawyer 
claimed the documents were protectd by the attorney-client privilege. The Court held that the 
privilege did not apply because the statements were taken from ''witnesses." 329 U.S. at SOS. 
However, the Court never explained why the employees' agency relationship did not privilege 
the communications. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2317, at 618; Weissenberger, supra 
note S, at 909 n.47 ("It remains a mystery, however, why the court did not consider an agency 
relationship between the partners and the crew members, which would have allowed applica-
tion of the privilege to the employees."). Compare Simon, supra note 7, at 959 n.20 (the crew 
members had claims of their own pending, so their statements were not made on behalf of 
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cause it rejected the premise that only those employees who direct 
the corporation's response to legal advice personify the corpora-
tion.29 Instead, the court concluded, without analysis,30 that any em-
ployee "is sufficiently identified with the corporation" whenever the 
communication satisfies the conditions of its "subject matter test."31 
The subject matter test has two principal virtues: it recognizes 
the interdependency of corporate personnel by extending the privi-
lege to communications from lower-level employees,32 and it encour-
ages the flow of information to corporate counsel.33 The test, 
however, fails effectively to distinguish communications made to se-
cure legal advice from those communications made to attorneys for 
other purposes. Because only communications made to secure legal 
advice are privileged,34 the test fails to provide an entirely satisfac-
tory solution to the unique problems posed by applying the attorney-
client privilege to communications from corporate clients. 
The Harper & Row opinion is susceptible to two interpretations 
regarding the legal advice requirement: either it fails to impose a 
their employers) with Weinschel,supra note 14, at 875 (Hickman decision based on the content 
of the documents, not the communicant). 
Prior to Up john, the lower courts disagreed on the interpretation of the "witness" limitation 
imposed by Hickman. Compare United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357-58 
(D. Mass. 1950) (communications of all employees within the privilege if they are made pursu-
ant to a request for legal advice) with Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. 
Supp. 483, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (under Hickman, lower-level employees are witnesses, not cli-
ents, and therefore their communications are not privileged). For criticism of the Westing-
house interpretation, see, e.g., Weissenberger, supra note 5, at 909 n.47 ("[I]t is questionable 
whether Hickman actually stands for the proposition that corporate employee witnesses are 
never the "client" for purposes of the privilege."); Weinschel, supra note 14, at 875 (Hickman 
only applies if a corporate employee describes what he saw as a witness); Michigan Note, supra 
note 5, at 371,376 (same). While the Upjohn court did not embrace the United Shoe interpre-
tation of Hickman, it implicitly rejected the Westinghouse interpretation because it indicated 
the :erivilege would apply to communications of lower-level employees that discuss matters 
within the scope of their employment. 449 U.S. at 394. The clear implication of Upjohn is that 
the communications of employees who discuss matters they observe as mere witnesses will not 
be privileged - a position that the commentators have long advocated. See, e.g., Kobak, 
supra note 2, at 365 ("The exception for the 'bystander' employee is a minimum necessity of 
the attorney-client privilege .... "); WEINSTEIN, supra note 8, ~503(b)[04], at 503-44 to 45; 
Weissenberger, supra note 5, at 912 n.59; Michigan Note, supra note 5, at 371. 
29. 423 F.2d at 491. 
30. Gergacz, supra note 1, at 492 ("Harper & Row never explained its dissatisfaction with 
the control group test . . . ."). 
31. 423 F.2d at 491. 
32. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 391 ("[middle level and lower-level] 
employees . . . have the relevant information needed by corporate counsel . . ."); Diversified 
Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (If middle- and lower-
level employees are not interviewed, it is difficult to determine what happened.); Weinschel, 
supra note 14, at 876 (the attorney faces a "Hobson's choice" under control group test). 
33. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en 
bane); Gergacz, supra note 1, at 492 (more information provided to counsel). 
34. See, e.g., WEINSTEIN, supra note 8, ~ 503(b)[04], at 503-48; Weissenberger, supra note 
5, at 901; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2290 at 542. 
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legal advice requirement or its command requirement35 serves as a 
substitute test for the legal advice requirement.36 If the test does not 
impose a legal advice requirement, as many authorities argue, a 
communication becomes privileged whenever an attorney receives 
the particular document.37 As a consequence, corporations can 
abuse the privilege and create a zone of silence by directing "all 
employees to channel business reports to corporate attorneys, 
thereby rendering all such communications privileged."38 If the 
command requirement is a substitute for the legal advice require-
ment, the test is totally ineffective because it fails to examine the 
purpose of the communication.39 The standard also enables a corpo-
ration to create the same zone of silence abuse because superiors can 
routinely approve communications between lower-level employees 
and corporate counsel.40 Thus, under both interpretations of Harper 
& Row, the subject matter test lacks an effective legal advice require-
ment, which enables the corporation to protect communications that 
are not properly within the scope of the privilege.41 
B. The Modffied Subject Matter Test 
In .Diversffied Industries, Inc. v. Meredith ,42 the Eighth Circuit 
adopted the "modified subject matter test," which provides that any 
35. The co=and requirement is the first element of the subject matter test; it requires that 
the "employee [make] the co=unication at the direction of his superiors in the corpora-
tion .... " 423 F.2d at 491. 
36. 423 F.2d at 491-92 (implication from court's failure to mention legal advice 
requirement). 
37. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 609; WEINSTEIN, supra note 
8, ~ 503(b)[04], at 503-47 to 49. 
38. Note, Privileged Communications - Inroads On the "Control Group" Test In The Cor-
porate Area, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 759, 766 (1971) (footnote omitted). See, e.g., United States 
v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530,541 (5th Cir. 1982) (general claim that corporate tax department 
funnels work through its attorneys insufficient to prove privilege); Nath, supra note 12, at 48-49 
("If . . . a co=unication made directly to the corporation's top management would not be 
privileged, but a co=unication directed to the corporation's lawyer would, management 
would have an incentive to order that all important co=unications take place directly to and 
through counsel.") (footnote omitted); Weissenberger, supra note S, at 912 (Harper & Row test 
creates excessive zone of silence); Harvard Note, supra note 2, at 432-33. (privilege widely 
available). 
39. See, e.g., Weissenberger, supra note S, at 912 (criticizing Harper & Row because privi-
lege is triggered whenever the superior authorizes the co=unication); cf. WEINSTEIN, supra 
note 8, ~ 503(b)[04], at 503-48 (test should include separate legal advice requirement). 
40. See Nath, supra note 12, at 49-50. . 
41. See text at note 34 supra. Very few courts have wholly relied on Harper & Row be-
cause of its overbroadness. See Gergacz, supra note 1, at 492 (courts have embraced subject 
matter approach, but have fashioned tests to narrow the scope of privilege). For two decisions 
that adopted Harper & Row, see Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. lmcoco-Gateway Corp., 62 
F.R.D. 454 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Hasso v. Retail Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Harper 
& Row was never cited by the Supreme Court in Upjohn. 
42. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977), modified on rehearing en bane 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 
1978). 
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corporate employee's communication is privileged if the corporation 
satisfies the following conditions:43 . 
(1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal ad-
vice; (2) the employee making the communication did so at the direc-
tion of his corporate superior; (3) the superior made the request so that 
the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the subject matter of the 
communication is within the scope of the employee's corporate duties; 
and (5) the communication is not disseminated beyond those persons 
who, because of the corporate structure, need to know its contents.44 
This test, the Eighth Circuit reasoned, offered a reasonable compro-
mise between the control group test and the subject matter test. Un-
like the control group test, this test properly accounts for the realities 
of corporate life because it privileges communications from informa-
tion holders even when they are not high-level decision makers, but 
it avoids the "zone of silence" abuse of the subject matter test by 
imposing a legal advice requirement.45 
The Eighth Circuit's test is a substantial improvement over the 
subject matter test because it narrows the availability of the privilege 
by imposing a confidentiality requirement46 and an explicit legal ad-
VICe requirement.47 The test, however, has two important flaws: (1) 
TheDiversifted court's application of its legal advice requirement un-
dermines the requirement's utility; and (2) the command require-
ment inhibits disclosures by middle- and lower-level employees and 
frustrates attorneys' attempts to ensure corporate compliance with 
the law. Both shortcomings frustrate the purposes of the privilege. 
1. The Legal Advice Requirement 
In Diversifted, the court allowed the corporation asserting the 
privilege to meet its prima facie burden on the legal advice require-
43. Traditionally, the party asserting the privilege bears the burden of proof. See, e.g., 
Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir. 1981); 
United States v. Bump, 605 F.2d 548,551 (9th Cir. 1978);In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 
81 F.R.D. 377, 394 (D.D.C. 1978); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 
1161 (D.S.C. 1974) (''The adversary party, by virtue of the obvious fact that it has not seen the 
documents, cannot be expected to bear the burden of establishing a lack of privilege."); Eutec-
tic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 41 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft 
Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117, 120 (M.D. Pa. 1970). 
44. 572 F.2d at 609. The JJivers!fied court adopted the standard proposed by Judge Wein-
stein. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 8, ~ 503(b)[04], at 503-47 to 50. 
45. 572 F.2d at 608-09. 
46. 572 F.2d at 609. Defining confidentiality in the corporate context is problematic be-
cause the corporate structure often requires three or more people to know the contents of a 
particular communication. A Michigan Note proposed that a communication is made in con-
fidence if the communication was distributed only to those who, because of the corporate 
structure, need to know its contents. See Michigan Note,supra note 5, at 377-79. Judge Wein-
stein incorporated this definition into his modified subject matter test See WEINSTEIN, supra 
note 8, ~ 503(b)[04], at 503-49 to 50. 
47. 572 F.2d at 609. 
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ment by showing that the communication was made to a lawyer.48 
The court ruled that unless the party opposing the privilege makes 
"a clear showing to the contrary," the privilege attaches to the com-
munication.49 Future courts should reject this allocation of the bur-
den of proof for two reasons. First, the factual premise of the burden 
allocation is erroneous. The Divers!fted court assumed that corpora-
tions normally employ attorneys to handle requests for legal advice 
and that rarely will corporate counsel provide business advice.50 But 
this premise has little to commend it. Unlike most individual clients, 
corporations constantly communicate with attorneys.st Many of 
these communications admittedly involve legal questions generated 
by the complexity and size of corporate operations.52 Many corpo-
rate executives, however, rely on attorneys for business advice, be-
cause the attorney knows the client's business as a result of their 
constant interaction. 53 Given that corporate attorneys provide both 
legal and business advice to corporate clients, it makes little sense to 
allow corporations to satisfy the legal advice requirement by a mere 
48. 572 F.2d at 610. The court cited Dean Wigmore for support of its position: 
It is not easy to frame a definite test for distinguishing legal from nonlegal advice. • • • 
[T]he most that can be said by way of generalization is that a matter committed to a 
professional legal adviser is prima facie so commilled for the sake of the legal advice which 
may be more or less desirable for some aspect of the matter, and is therefore within the 
privilege unless it clearly appears to be lacking in aspects requiring legal advice. 
Obviously, much depends upon the circumstances of individual transactions. 
8 J. W1GMORE, supra note 1, § 2296, at 566-67 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
49. 572 F.2d at 610. 
50. The .Diversified court's citation of Wigmore, see note 48 supra, for its position is suspect 
at best. Dean Wigmore's prima facie analysis was developed for natural persons, not corpora- . 
tions. See Weissenberger, supra note 5, at 916. Thus, his allocation of the burden of proof 
makes sense for individuals, not corporations. In addition, a strong argument can be made 
that an individual engaged in a business enterprise is not different from a corporation, and 
therefore Wigmore's analysis should be limited to the noncommercial context. 
51. See note 9 supra. 
52. See generally, Kobak, supra note 2, at 340 (legal advice needed "to separate whims of 
. . . client[s] from immediate gratification"); Simon, supra note 7, at 955; Iowa Comment, 
supra note 12, at 16 ("[C]orporations may possess the most glaring need for unfettered legal 
advice in modem society."). 
The privilege is the same for in-house and outside counsel. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. 
v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 36-37 (D. Md. 1974); Air-Shield, Inc. v. Air Reduction Co., 46 
F.R.D. 96, 97 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Malco Mfg. Co. v. Elco Corp., 45 F.R.D. 24, 26 (D. Minn. 
1968); New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 285 F. Supp. 868, 869 (D. Kan. 
1968); United States v. United Shoe Mach., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1950). 
53. See note 9 supra; Rast, Whal the Chief Executive Looks for in his Corporate Low .De-
partment, 33 Bus. LAW. 811, 813 (1978) (legal advice should be combined with business ad-
vice). One commentator, however, argues that in-house attorneys are "so keenly aware of the 
dimensions of their roles that they would ordinarily abjure business admonitions better left to 
management or other business personnel." The author readily admits his thesis is "entirely 
conjectural," and needs empirical testing. Kobak, supra note 2, at 353. Conjecture is hardly a 
compelling basis for allowing large corporations to gain the benefits of the presumption of 
"legal advice" whenever a communication is sent to counsel. Bui cf. Program, A Businessman !r 
View of Lawyers, 33 Bus. LAW. 817, 819 (1978) ("[U]nless it's a special relationship, the chief 
executive normally doesn't like to receive business advice mixed in with legal advice.") (Com-
ments of Donald N. Frey, Chairman of the Board, Bell & Howell). 
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showing that the communication was made to an attomey.54 
Second, placing the "real" burden on the party opposing the 
privilege may nullify the legal advice requirement. A corporation 
can always satisfy its prima fade burden because, unless the commu-
nication was sent to a lawyer, the issue of the attorney-client privi-
lege would not arise. The burden of proof then shifts to the 
opposing party, who must establish that the communication was not 
made to secure legal advice. That party labors under two handicaps. 
First, without access to the communication, it will be difficult to ar-
gue intelligently that the corporation did not seek legal advice with 
that particular communication.55 Second, even if the party in-
troduces circumstantial evidence that tends to establish that the cor-
poration did not seek legal advice in the communication, the 
evidence may not suffice to satisfy the "clear showing to the con-
trary" standard imposed by the.Divers!fied court.56 Thus, the.Diversi-
fied court's allocation of the burden of proof on the legal advice 
requirement creates the possiblity that all communications to attor-
neys will be privileged, in effect eliminating the legal advice 
requirement. 
2. The Command Requirement 
Under the Eighth Circuit's test, the privilege applies to communi-
cations from lower- and middle-level employees to counsel only if 
the employee's superior authorizes such communication and the su-
perior is seeking legal advice on behalf of the corporation.57 The 
command requirement frustrates the purposes of the privilege in two 
respects. First, the varying definition of "superior" undermines the 
predictability essential to ensuring the full benefits of the privilege. 
54. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 612-14 (8th Cir. 1978) (en 
bane) (Henley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("A communication is not privileged 
simply because one of the parties to it is a lawyer.") (citations omitted). Although Judge Hen-
ley criticized the majority for its allocation of the burden of proof, he based his dissent on his 
finding, after in camera inspection of the pertinent documents, that the attorneys were not 
employed to provide legal services. 572 F.2d at 614. 
55. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 614 (Henley, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) ("[T]he party seeking disclosure does not know in advance and has no way 
of knowing why the matter in question was turned over to the lawyer or why the communica-
tions were developed or what they amounted to or contained."). 
56. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 614 (Henley, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) ("[A]part from in camera proceedings ... there is no way for the party 
seeking disclosure to [overcome] the prima facie case of privilege .... "); Weissenberger, 
supra note 5, at 917. 
The .Divers!fied court's analysis also fails to provide a test to distinguish communications 
made to secure legal advice from communications made for other purposes. Thus, even in in 
camera proceedings, judges are left without guidance. See Weissenberger, supra note 5, at 
917, 919 (division of opinion on the legal advice issue demonstrates .Divers!fied's failure to 
develop a meaningful legal advice requirement). 
57. See text at note 44 supra. For purposes of this Note, these two conditions will be 
referred to as the command requirement. 
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Second, in some situations, the requirement inhibits the fl.ow of in-
formation from middle and lower level employees and frustrates at-
torneys' attempts to ensure corporate compliance with the law. 
a. Uncertainty. The command requirement creates uncertainty 
in applying the privilege because the definition of "superior" de-
pends on the circumstances of each case. 58 The term can never ac-
quire a uniform meaning because the size of corporations and the 
division of responsibility within them vary greatly.59 Thus, defining 
"superior" results in the same uncertainty as was created by the defi-
nition of "control group." The Upjohn Court condemned that un-
certainty and those comments are equally applicable here.60 
Judge Weinstein, the originator of the modified subject matter 
test adopted in Divers!fted, argues that defining uncertainty in func-
tional terms can avoid uncertainty: A superior is one "who is in a 
position to initiate a request for legal advice and whose actions indi-
cate that his purpose in directing disclosure to the attorney was in 
contemplation of the rendition oflegal services."61 But Judge Wein-
stein's solution begs the question because it does not define when a 
person is in the position, and therefore has the authority, to request 
legal advice. Moreover, Judge Weinstein admits the uncertainty of 
his own test by recognizing that in some circumstances a communi-
cation made by a lower-level employee on his own initiative will be 
privileged.62 He fails, however, to explain why the privilege should 
apply in some circumstances but not in others.63 Thus, Judge Wein-
58. Cf. WEINSTEIN, supra note 8, ~ 503(b)[04] at 503-48 ("The question of who is a supe• 
rior ... is a difficult one."). 
59. Rast, supra note 53, at 812 ("[B]usincsses differ. They differ as to their products and 
services. They differ in structure, in size, and in scope of operations."). 
60. See note l8supra and accompanying text. This criticism applies to theAmpicil/i11 test. 
Under that test, a communication is privileged if four requirements are satisfied: 
(1) The particular employee or representative of the corporation must have made a com-
munication of information which was reaso11ably believed to be 11ecessary to the decisio11-
making process concerning a problem on which legal advice was sought; (2) the communi-
cation must have been made for the purpose of securing legal advice; (3) the subject mat-
ter of the communication to or from an employee must have been related to the 
performance by the employee of the duties of his employment; and (4) the communication 
must have been a confidential one. . 
In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377,385 (D.D.C. 1978) (emphasis in original). 
While the Ampicil/in court must be applauded for eliminating the command requirement, see 
notes 86-105 in.fro and accompanying text, the first element of the test creates uncertainty be-
cause it does not indicate who determines whether the communication is reasonably necessary 
to the decision-making process concerning a legal problem and when that belief must be held. 
See Gergacz, supra note l, at 495-96; cf. Fordham Note, supra note 9, at 1289 (test offers "only 
cosmetic differences, in an already murky field"); New England Note, supra note 20, at 938 
(test does not provide predictability, but it does provide realistic treatment of corporate life). 
61. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 8, ~ 503(b)[04], at 503-48 to 49. 
62. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 8, ~ 503(b)[04], at 503-48 to 49. 
63. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 8, ~ 503(b)[04], at 503-48 to 49. 
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stein's analysis does little to resolve the uncertainty resulting from 
the command requirement. 
The purpose of the privilege is to encourage full and frank com-
munication between clients and their attorneys.64 The command re-
quirement undermines this objective by introducing uncertainty 
about whether the privilege will apply because of the employee's po-
sition in the corporation. 
b. Inteifering With the Flow of Information to Counsel. The 
command requirement vests superiors with the authority either to 
prohibit communications from lower-level employees or to alter 
their contents.65 Consequently, the command requirement distorts 
the flow of information to counsel, frustrating attorneys' efforts to 
obtain accurate information and to ensure corporate compliance 
with the law. 
Initially, it is important to recognize that superiors are not better 
able to recognize potential legal problems simply by virtue of their 
position in the corporation. Generally, superiors are not lawyers. 
The increased interaction with attorneys that accompanies higher 
rank in the corporation does not eliminate this educational barrier, 66 
although it may mitigate it. In addition, superiors, as well as coun-
sel, must to some extent rely on subordinates either to alert them to 
potential legal problems or to provide information for a previously 
recognized legal problem, because these employees often possess 
knowledge unavailable to superiors or to counsel.67 
Under the command requirement, a lower-level employee who 
identifies a potential legal problem must either seek approval from 
his superior to discuss the matter with counsel or forward the inf or-
64. See note I supra and accompanying text. 
65. See text at note 44 supra. 
66. Cf. Program, supra note 53, at 831 (1978) ("(L]aw is very complex, bewildering, and 
frustrating for most ofus who have not been in the legal profession.") (comment of Donald P. 
Kelley, President, Esmark, Inc.) 
67. q: Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981) (information not available to 
upper-echelon); Rast, supra note 53 at 814: 
I look to the Legal Department for advice which will prevent legal problems from arising. 
Its ability to do this must come from two sources. First, an intimate knowledge of the 
buisness with particular sensitivity to all changes in policy and operating procedures. And 
second intimate knowledge of all changes in the law which might possibly have an impact 
on the business. I have a responsibility with respect to the first point, to see that the Legal 
Department is continuously represented in the highest councils of management. The sec-
ond point, knowledge of changes in the law, is the sole responsibility of the lawyer 
himself. 
These comments indicate that corporate executives expect attorneys to keep abreast of 
changes in law, while they are primarily responsible for providing the ?ttorneys with the facts 
attorneys need to formulate legal opinions. However, even representation at the highest levels 
of management may not ensure the attorney receives complete and accurate information. Cf. 
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 386 (independent accounting firm apprised in-house 
counsel of questioJ?,able payments to officials of foreign governments). 
682 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 81:665 
mation to the superior who, in turn, forwards it to counsel along with 
a request for legal advice.68 While this requirement is reasonable for 
corporate governance, 69 it only interferes with the information flow 
to counsel. 
This interference can take several forms. First, every intervening 
layer of administrative authority separating information from coun-
sel adds to the probability of omission or distortion.70 The superior 
may erroneously, albeit innocently, conclude that no legal problem 
exists, or that additional legal advice would only duplicate previous 
consultations.71 The superior may delete some information in the 
mistaken belief that it does not relate to the particular problem. 
Thus, even honest and conscientious management may implement 
the command requirement so as to frustrate the purpose of encour-
aging an open and complete flow of information to counsel. 
The second possibility of intervention involves questionable con-
duct on the part of the superior. Where the lower-level employee 
advances information potentially implicating the superior in inap-
propriate or perhaps even criminal conduct, the command require-
ment permits the superior to conceal his own wrongdoing through 
distortion or inaction. 72 
Finally, the need to go to the superior before consulting the cor-
porate counsel exerts a chilling effect on lower-level employees. 
Even if their information is innocuous, or although damaging would 
receive scrupulous investigation from the superior, the perceived ex-
posure to retaliation from one's immediate superior can only inhibit 
68. See text at note 44 supra. 
69. See note 67 supra. It can hardly be gainsaid that corporate executives would condone 
the repeated violations of corporate lines of responsibility that would occur if lower-lever em-
ployees talk directly to counsel. This concern, however, is totally irrelevant in determining 
whether the privilege attaches to such a communication. 
10. See Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Mis-
conduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1138 (1977) ("Even absent the 
distorting impact of preexisting attitudes on information flow, experimental evidence suggests 
that serial relay of information results in significant information loss. Information theorists 
have formulated the rule that each additional relay in a communications system halves the 
message while doubling the 'noise.'") (footnotes omitted); Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading 
Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (1982) 
("In large corporations, this information may pass through as many as fifteen hierachical levels 
from bottom to top. Organizational and communications scholars have confirmed the obvi-
ous: m,erely because the information is transmitted so many times, the message becomes dis-
torted.") (footnotes omitted). 
11. See Haft, Business i)ecisions by the New Board· Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 
80 MICH. L. REv. 1, 55 (1982) (Behavioral scientists "have shown, for example, that most 
individuals misinterpret highly relevant evidence in making intuitive judgments."). The phe-
nomenon of cognitive dissonance increases the probability of this result. See Coffee, supra 
note 70, at 1137-38. See generally L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 
(1957). 
72. Cases of corporate misconduct that have come to light confirm this possibility. See 
Coffee, supra note 70, at 1131 n. 109 ("informal internal organizations" actively concealed im-
proper payments by Lockheed and a secret political fund at Firestone). 
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subordinates' requests for legal advice.73 The potential futility of 
such a request adds to the likely unwillingness of subordinates to 
request such advice through their superiors. Given that a vulnerable 
subordinate must weigh these risks at each level of the corporate bu-
reaucracy, the command requirement clearly contravenes the privi-
lege's purpose of fostering full disclosure to corporate counsel.74 
II. A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The previous Part criticized both the subject matter test and the 
modified subject matter test for frustrating the purposes of the attor-
ney-client privilege. This Part argues that the courts should adopt 
the modified subject matter test, with two further changes. First, the 
legal advice requirement should be reformulated to better distin-
guish communications made to secure legal advice from communi-
cations made for other purposes. Second, the command requirement 
should be eliminated, because it restricts the flow of information 
from middle- and lower-level employees to corporate counsel, with-
out producing any benefits that are consistent with the logic of the 
privilege. 
A. Modification of the Legal Advice Requirement 
Because the modified subject matter test fails to provide a totally 
effective legal advice requirement, communications made to secure 
business advice may be privileged.75 Consequently, the test removes 
the particular communication from the discovery process without 
producing any social benefit in the form of increased communica-
tions to secure legal advice.76 The frequent interaction between cor-
porate clients and their attomeys77 exacerbates this distortion of the 
privilege's competing interests. 
To avoid this problem, and to provide courts with a standard for 
making the legal advice determination,78 the legal advice require-
ment should focus on the advice that is being sought by the corpora-
73. The proposition that self-interest influences information transfers within organizations 
is intuitively plausible and widely accepted. See, e.g., R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL 
THEORY OF THE FIRM 81-82, 109-10 {1963). 
74. See text at notes 1-3 supra. 
15. See text at notes 48-56 supra. 
76. See notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text. 
77. See note 9 supra. Cf. Program, supra note 53, at 844 ("Because of the increasing com-
plexity of the law, we now have almost continual contact with our attorneys instead of spo-
radic and infrequent consultations.") (comment of Jerome Van Gorkum, President of Trans 
Union Corporation). 
78. See note 56 supra. One court has stated that the contents of documents must be ex-
amined to determine whether the corporation was seeking legal advice. In re Ampicillin Anti-
trust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 394 (D.D.C. 1978). However, simply stating this truism 
without providing a test is of little utility. 
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tion.79 Dean Wigmore's standard test achieves these objectives.80 
Accordingly, a communication should satisfy the legal advice re-
quirement if the advice sought by a corporate employee, pursuant to 
which the communication is made, is advice that can be given only 
by a qualified legal practitioner.81 To limit the privilege to its nar-
rowest application, the courts should strengthen this requirement by 
requiring the corporation to prove that the purpose of the communi-
cation was to secure legal advice, before the burden of proof shifts to 
the party opposing the privilege. 82 
This procedure has two advantages over the .Divers!fted court's 
formulation of the legal advice requirement. First, instead of focus-
ing on the party to whom the communication is made, the proposed 
solution requires scrutiny of each communication thereby avoiding 
the presumption of legal advice resulting from the Divers!fted court's 
burden allocation.83 Second, the proposed solution provides a stan-
79. See In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377,394 (D.D.C. 1978) ("whether 
it was legal advice that was being sought") (emphasis in original); cf. New England Note, 
supra note 20, at 943-44 (''The focus of the privilege is no longer solely on who within the 
corporate hierarchy communicates with legal counsel, but rather what is communicated and 
how the information correlates with the particular employee's position.") (emphasis in 
original). 
80. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2292 at 554 ("[l)egal advice of any kind is sought 
... from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such ... "), 
81. The proposed test is but a slight modification of the first two elements of Dean Wig-
more's test. See note 6 supra. Judge Henley, in his partial dissent in lJiversffied implicitly 
adopted this standard. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 596, 614-15 (8th 
Cir. 1978) (en bane) (Henley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (reviewing documents 
in camera and concluding that advice could have been given by any person possessing com-
mon sense and business prudence). 
One commentator suggests a "but for" analysis for determining when a corporation seeks 
legal advice: "If a communication would not have existed but for the pursuit of legal advice, 
the communication is privileged." Weissenberger, supra note 5, at 918 (emphasis in original). 
Such an approach fails for three reasons. First, it is circular: declaring that a communication is 
privileged when it is made solely in the "pursuit of legal advice" is not helpful when "pursuit 
of legal advice" is not defined. 
Second, the "but for" test is too restrictive. By requiring that the document only be sent to 
lawyers, the test incorporates the confidentiality requirement into an analysis of whether legal 
advice was sought by the corporation. However, because corporate executives depend on one 
another for information to perform their respective duties, it seems not only unrealistic, but 
also unjust to deprive the corporation of the privilege simply because some corporate execu-
tives receive copies of the particular communication. See Michigan Note, supra note 5, at 377-
79. 
Third, the proposal argues, based on the facts of lJiversffied, that, as a general proposition, 
if the corporation has a fiduciary or other duty to undertake an investigation, irrespective of 
any "legal advice" considerations, communications are not made "but for" securing legal ad-
vice, and, therefore, should not be privileged. Id at 920. Corporations, however, conduct 
investigations precisely to determine whether or not disclosure to shareholders, the IRS, or the 
SEC, is mandated. Therefore, the decision to investigate is not made independent of a request 
for legal advice but precisely because the corporation has legal obligations which it must fulfill. 
Therefore to argue that the communications were not made to secure legal advice is fallacious, 
82. E.g., In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 394 (D.D.C. 1978); WEIN· 
STEIN, supra note 8, ~ 503(b )(04), at 503-47 to 48. The party seeking to obtain the privilege has 
traditionally borne the burden of proof. See note 43 supra. 
83. See notes 50-54 supra and accompanying text. 
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dard that courts can apply in in camera proceedings. 84 
This solution has two admitted shortcomings. Clients may at-
tempt to circumvent the requirement by framing requests for busi- · 
ness advice in language that indicates the corporation was seeking 
legal advice. 85 In addition, scrutiny of each communication pro-
duces uncertainty, while achieving the full benefits of the privilege 
requires certainty.86 
While these shortcomings diminish the utility of the proposed so-
lution, they inhere in any judicial application of a general standard 
to a particular case. The alternative- aper se rule that all commu-
nications to attorneys are either privileged or not privileged - elimi-
nates the objectional features of the proposed formulation of the 
legal advice requirement, but the costs of a per se rule clearly out-
weigh the benefits that would accrue. 87 Instead, one must rely on the 
judiciary to apply this standard to each case to determine whether or 
not the claim oflegal advice is a sham. Once the courts agree on the 
proper standard for the privilege, they will develop a consistent body 
of case law that will enable attorneys to predict with reasonable cer-
tainty whether a particular communication will be privileged. 
Moreover, the uncertainty created by the approach advocated 
here would not apply to communications clearly requesting legal ad-
vice. These communications, including those relating to potential 
civil or criminal liability for corporate misconduct, are those where 
the free flow of information to counsel can do the most to ensure 
effective legal advice and corporate compliance with the law. Any 
test will produce some uncertainty in borderline cases; the test de-
fended by this Note relegates that uncertainty to communications of 
at least an arguably business nature. Since chilling these communi-
cations imposes only private costs (costs which increase the likeli-
hood that they will take place notwithstanding the uncertain 
availability of the privilege), the consequences of uncertainty under 
84. See note 56 supra. An in camera review also offers one possible solution to the prob-
lem of communications made partly for business purposes and partly to secure legal advice. 
The judge can order discovery of only those portions of the communication not related to 
securing legal advice. The courts rely on such selective disclosure in many other situations. 
For example, in resolving an administrative agency's request for grand jury transcripts, the 
court must limit disclosure to the material for which the agency has "particularized need." In 
such cases, the court can grant access to some parts of the transcript but not others. See In re 
Disclosure of Testimony Before the Grand Jury, 580 F.2d 281, 287 (8th Cir. 1978); Weis-
senberger, supra note 5, at 924 ("In reality, most cases can be resolved by virtue of in camera 
severance of privileged from nonprivileged matters."). 
85. q: Nath, supra note 12, at 55-58. 
86. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. 
87. If all communications to attorneys are privileged, communications with attorneys are 
encouraged, but attorneys become repositories of undiscoverable information. If all communi-
cations to attorneys are not privileged, the number of communications to attorneys will de-
crease, and attorneys will face a substantial obstacle in their quest to render sound legal advice 
and to ensure corporate compliance with the law. See notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text. 
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the proposed approach may well prove less significant than 
anticipated. 
The solution proposed by this Note is more consistent with the 
purposes of the privilege than the .Diversified court's approach be-
cause it requires corporations to establish affirmatively that legal ad-
vice was being sought at the time of. the communication. By 
requiring such a showing, the proposed requirement eliminates the 
overinclusiveness objection to the .Diversified court's approach, and 
achieves an optimal balance between encouraging clients to commu-
nicate with counsel to secure legal advice and preventing corporate 
attorneys from becoming repositories of undiscoverable information. 
Thus, the proposed formulation of the legal advice requirement is 
preferable to that imposed by the .Diversified court. 
B. Elimination of the Command Requirement 
The command requirement frustrates the policies of the attorney-
client privilege in two respects. First, it engenders uncertainty in ap-
plying the ·privilege because the definition of "superior" varies with 
the facts of each case. 88 Second, it not only creates the possibility 
that counsel will not receive completely accurate information from 
the corporation, but also frustrates attorneys' efforts at ensuring cor-
porate compliance with the law by empowering superiors, at all 
levels of the corporation, to suppress subordinate initiated investiga-
tions where_ the propriety of the superior's acts may be called into 
question. 89 In the light of these considerations, it seems logical to 
eliminate the requirement.90 
However, eliminating the requirement would result in deeming 
all employees the "client" for purposes of the privilege. Thus, every 
employee could request legal advice. Moreover, all communications 
made pursuant to such a request that discussed matters within the 
scope of the employee's corporate duties would be privileged.91 
88. See text at notes 57-64 supra. 
89. See text at notes 68-74supra. 
90. As one commentator has stated in criticizing the control group test: 
An employee who lacks power may not be wanting in zeal. If such an earnest soul per-
ceives a problem while acting within the scope of his employment and subsequently 
secures legal advice, the communication ought to be privileged, even if the outcome is 
determined by those to whom he reports. The potential for social benefit inherent in the 
communication does not vary drastically with the status of its narrator. 
Kobak,supra note 2, at 368; accord Iowa Comment,supra note 12, at 175 ("[I]fthe corporation 
receives legal advice as a result of an employee's unsolicited, confidential communication, the 
purpose of the privilege is still served.") (footnotes omitted). Even Judge Weinstein, who pro-
posed the modified subject matter test, admits that the command requirement need not be 
satisfied in certain situations; unfortunately, he does not provide an adequate explanation of 
the extenuating circumstances that warrant abandoning the requirement. See WEINSTEIN, 
supra note 8, ,r 503(b)[04], at 503-47 to 49. 
91. Several courts have stated that the privilege applies to communications of all employ-
ees pursuant to a request for legal advice. However, none of the cases involved the issue of 
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Two objections can be made to such an expansive definition of 
the "client." The first is that the zone of silence will expand. The 
second is that treating all employees as representatives of the client 
may distort the corporation's decision-making structure. This sec-
tion analyzes these arguments, finds them wanting, and concludes 
that the command requirement should be eliminated. 
1. Enlarging the Zone of Silence 
One possible justification92 for the command requirement is that 
it may be needed to narrow the scope of the privilege.93 While this 
goal is laudable, the use of the command requirement to achieve it is 
misplaced, because the requirement limits neither of the factors that 
creates the "zone of silence." 
The zone of silence is a· function of the number of communica-
tions to counsel and the ability to distinguish communications made 
to secure legal advice from communications made for other pur-
poses.94 The first factor can not be controlled by changing the re-
quirements of the privilege because business enterprises, whether 
they are conducted as sole proprietorships or as corporations, will 
increase requests for legal advice as the size and complexity of oper-
whether a lower-level employee must first be authorized to speak to counsel before his commu-
nication is privileged. See, e.g., In re LTV Sec. Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595, 599-603 (N.D. Tex. 
1981) (The "Upjohn .•. court made clear that the privilege applies to comID:.unications made 
by corporate employees concerning matters pertinent to their job tasks, regardless of echelon, 
if sought by the corporation's attorney in order to ... render legal advice .... "); SEC v. Gulf 
& Western Indus., Inc. 518 F. Supp. 675,681 n.9 (D.D.C. 1981) (leaving open the issue of who 
must request legal advice); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 76 
F.R.D. 47, 56-57 (W.D. Pa. 1977); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 
251, 252 (N.D.N.Y. 1960) (president requested that subordinate provide counsel with informa-
tion); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 797, 795 (D. Del. 1954); 
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950). 
92. The JJivers!fied court did not offer an explanation for the command requirement. 
However, Judge Weinstein, whose modified subject matter test was adopted by the JJivers!fied 
court, criticized United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 
1950), for its holding that all communications "by an officer or employee" of the corporation 
would be privileged, on the ground that "such a broad approach is incompatible with other 
features of our procedural system (because it] runs competely counter to the modern trends of 
broad discovery .... " WEINSTEIN, supra note 8, f503(b)[04), at 503-44 to 45. Stated con-
versely, Judge Weinstein's criticism becomes a zone of silence argument against eliminating 
the command requirement. Bui see note 90 supra for the inconsistency in Judge Weinstein's 
position. 
93. See Nath, supra note 12, at 48 ("no subject matter of a nature significant to the corpo-
ration would not be privileged under [the subject matter test]"); Simon, supra note 7, at 955 
(suggesting, without support, that extending the privilege to communications of all employees 
creates a privilege broader than that afforded individuals); cf. Gardner, supra note 5, at 342 
(privilege should only apply to small corporations because such corporations are alter-ego of a 
few individuals). 
94. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 7, at 955-56 (variables that affect the size of the zone of 
silence include the "number of agents, masses of documents, and frequent dealings with 
lawyers"). 
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ations increase.95 The second factor is not properly addressed by the 
command requirement, because whether the superior authorizes the 
communication to counsel does not determine whether the legal ad-
vice is being sought by the corporation.96 Instead, that issue is more 
accurately resolved through an effective legal advice requirement.97 
Thus, abandoning the command requirement will not enlarge the 
zone of silence created by the privilege.98 
One could argue that limiting the number of employees who can 
request legal advice also limits the scope of the privilege,99 but there 
is no logical reason for imposing such a limitation. If the employee 
requests legal advice for the benefit of the corporation, it makes little 
sense to withhold the privilege simply because the particular em-
ployee is not a superior. Regardless of the employee's position, the 
corporation will receive the same benefit from the legal advice. 
Moreover, the privilege's primary purpose - encouraging communi-
cations between clients and attorneys - is fulfilled irrespective of 
95. See Rast, supra note 53, at 812 (emphasis added): 
I think it is essential that all of us remember that businesses differ. They differ as to their 
products and services. They differ in structure, in size, and in scope of operations. And 
for our purpose here today, corporations quite obviously dtffer in their exposure to the var/• 
ous aspects of the law. 
96. See Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (the 
second element of the test requires that "the employee making the communication did so at 
the direction of his corporate superior."). 
97. See text at notes 75-83 supra for discussion of the legal advice requirement. 
98. One could also argue that the zone of silence is not nearly as ominous as it would first 
appear. The privilege only applies to communications, not the underlying facts. Therefore, the 
party seeking to obtain the information need only depose the communicant. See Upjohn Co. 
v. United States, 449 U.S. at 395-96 (citing Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F.2d 
830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962)). Second, independently preexisting documents, even if given to at-
torneys, will not be privileged unless they were privileged in the clients' hands. Fisher v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 404-05 (1976); J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2307, at 591-94; 
Miller, The Corporate Attorney Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine: Protection from 
Compelled Disclosure in Criminal Investigation of a Corporation, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 569, 587 
(1978). Third, the privilege does not apply to planning fraudulent or criminal activities, See, 
e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 76 F.R.D. 47, 57 (W.D. Pa. 
1977); Hazard, supra note 1, at 1063. 
Opponents counter that applying the privilege to all corporate communications exacerbates 
the privilege's deleterious effect on the discovery process. See note 4 supra and accompanying 
text. The cost of obtaining information increases. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 
U.S. at 386-87 (employees around the world). Employees' memories fade, their testimony falls 
into line with the official corporate position, and opposing counsel become powerless to verify 
the testimony. See, e.g., Nath,supra note 12, at 48 n.128, 51; Hazard,supra note 1, at 1062 (the 
privilege is "a device for cover-ups"). _ 
The reponse to this argument lies in the policy judgment implicit in the privilege's exis-
tence: whenever the purposes of the privilege are fulfilled, society must bear the costs the 
privilege imposes on the discovery process. As the Upjohn court concluded, extending the 
privilege to communications of lower-level employees fulfills those purposes. Upjohn Co. v. 
United States, 449 U.S. at 391-93. This argument for limiting the privilege is inconsistent with 
that judgment, and should therefore be rejected. 
99. Cf. Nath, supra note 12, at 37-54 (arguing for control group test); Harvard Note, supra 
note 2 (same). 
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the communicant's position in the corporation.100 Thus, the zone of 
silence argument should be rejected because it advocates_ limitation 
for its own sake, amounting in principle to an argument against the 
existence of the privilege. 
2. Corporate Decision-Making 
A second argument against the elimination of the command re-
quirement is that permitting all employees to request legal advice 
and to submit communications pursuant to such requests will disturb 
the corporate decision-making structure. Superiors would not learn 
of the information that subordinates provide counsel. Legal fees 
would arguably increase. Perhaps worst of all, subordinates might 
attempt to undermine a superior's authority by bringing frivolous 
claims that call into question the superior's abilities or allegiance to 
the company. 
More importantly, this analysis is theoretically appealing because 
it achieves a symmetry between individuals and corporations in ap-
plying the privilege.101 Superiors are deemed to personify the inter-
ests of the corporation because they function like individuals who 
employ agents: each possesses the authority to request legal advice 
and each controls the behavior of subordinates or agents. 102 Thus, it 
seems logical to require a superior to request legal advice and then 
authorize communications from lower-level employees to counsel. 
This argument is ultimately unpersuasive for three reasons. First, 
the fundamental issue is not whether the corporation's decision-mak-
ing structure will be disturbed; rather it is whether protecting re-
quests for legal advice made by lower-level employees is consistent 
with the purposes of the privilege.103 All the purposes of the privi-
lege are fulfilled when a lower-level employee requests legal advice. 
Counsel receives information on which to base legal advice. That 
100. See Kobak, supra note 2, at 368, 371; Iowa Co=ent, supra note 12, at 175; cf. WEIN-
stein, supra note 8, at~ 503(b)[04), at 503-48 to -49 (when lower-level employee initiates re-
quest for legal advice, corporation "must show that the co=unication, from its inception, was 
intended to be made in order to obtain legal services . . . "). 
101. The courts and co=entators for the most part have analyzed the scope of the privi-
lege for corporations by drawing an analogy to individuals who employ agents. Both the sub-
ject matter test and modified subject matter test implicitly accept the premise that the scope of 
the privilege should be determined by analogy to individuals who employ agents. See, e.g., 
Harper & Row Publications, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), q/fd per curiam by an 
equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971) (privilege only applies to co=unication of lower-
level employees if superiors have requested such co=unications); Diversified Indus. v. Mere-
dith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (same). Several co=entators have expressly 
adopted this analytical approach. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 7, at 963-66; Gardner, supra 
n1;1te 5, at 384-88. 
102. An individual's privilege extends to co=unications of his agents. 8 J. WIGMORE 
supra note 1, § 2317, at 618. 
103. q. Kobak, supra note 2, at 371 (''The appropriate question to ask in every case is not 
who contacted an attorney, but why?"). 
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this information may not have otherwise come to the attorney's at-
tention enables him to serve the client more effectively. Moreover, if 
the information concerns questionable or patently illegal behavior of 
a superior, which in all likelihood will be the only cause for lower-
level employees to communicate directly to counsel, corporate attor-
neys will be able to further corporate compliance with the law by 
notifying the appropriate corporate officials. Upjohn suggests that 
the scope of the privilege depends upon its own underlying logic, 
notwithstanding adverse implications for other policies. Given that 
the proposed test fulfills the purposes of the privilege, the chance 
that it may also disturb the management structure of the corporation 
may be simply irrelevant. 
Second, an attempt to equate superiors at all levels of the corpo-
ration with individuals who employ agents is misguided because, un-
like individual clients, the interests of the corporation and those of a 
particular superior do not necessarily coincide. When an individual 
requests legal advice and requires his agent to provide information 
pursuant to that request, that course of action is, by definition, in the 
client's best interest. In contrast, a superior, who may not even rank 
among those in the upper echelon of the corporation, may frustrate a 
subordinate's investigation of a particular legal matter to avoid scru-
tiny of his own behavior. In such a situation, it is the subordinate 
who represents the interests of the client-corporation. Because all 
employees at all levels of the corporation may at one time or another 
represent the corporation's interest, 104 the analogy to an individual 
client who employs agents is erroneous. 
Third, the supposed interference with corporate operations that 
would result from eliminating the command requirement is more ap-
parent than real. Faced with threat of demotion or dismissal, mid-
dle- or lower-level employees will not initiate a request for legal 
advice unless they believe that working within the corporate struc-
ture would prove fruitless. In this situation, however, the 
subordinate's ability to communicate with counsel assumes the most 
importance. Superiors can otherwise place their own interest above 
that of the corporation. Thus, abolishing the command requirement 
will lead, in practice, to requests for legal advice by lower-level em-
ployees when such a request is in the best interest of the corporation. 
One could argue, however, that a corporation's decision-making 
structure should not be ignored because, even if subordinates may 
request legal advice, supervisors can simply refuse to act on counsel's 
104. See Kobak, supra note, at 368; WEINSTEIN, supra note 8, ~ 503(b)[04) at 503-48 to -49 
("[A) communication which a rather low level employee made on his own initiative may be 
privileged if the court can find that the employee consciously divulged his information to the 
attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice which would benefit the corporation,"); 
Iowa Comment, supra note 12, at 175. 
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advice. 105 Assuming that following the advice furthers the corpora-
tion's interest, upper-level executives such as the Chief Executive Of-
ficer or members of the Board of Directors, could place their 
personal interest above that of the corporation and refuse to follow 
counsel's advice. No lower-level employee has the authority to chal-
lenge their behavior, so the subordinate's authorization to request 
legal advice would have no effect. 
The fallacy of this argument is that the net effect is not the same. 
The command requirement increases exponentially the probability 
that the purposes of privilege will be frustrated because superiors at 
all levels are empowered to interfere with or totally prohibit the flow 
of information to counsel. These supervisors, who may be relatively 
low-ranking corporate officials, may not themselves possess the 
power to contact counsel, but they do have the power to prohibit the 
flow of information to their superiors in the corporate hierarchy. 
Thus, these supervisors may effectively prevent disclosure of poten-
tially illegal behavior. 
In contrast, the elimination of the command requirement allows 
only the highest ranking officials to place their personal interests 
above that of the corporation. Not only does this of itself dramati-
cally lessen the possibility of supressing legally relevant information, 
but these officials may respond to other influences that inhibit them 
from acting contrary to the best interest of the corporation. Their 
fiduciary duty to the corporation is one such influence.106 Another is 
the coercive ability of corporate counsel, who for ethical reasons 
must represent the interests of the corporation. 107 Together these in-
fluences diminish the risk of high ranking officials subverting the 
corporation's best interest. Therefore, while eliminating the com-
mand requirement may not totally effectuate the privilege's purpose 
of ensuring corporate compliance with the law, it will, together with 
other constraints on the behavior of upper-level officials, signifi-
cantly increase the probability of achieving this objective. 
Neither argument for retaining the command requirement is ulti-
mately persuasive. Even though the zone of silence arguably will 
increase, no reason supports limiting the privilege on the basis of the 
communicant's position in the corporation. II]. addition, eliminating 
105. A variation of this argument is often cited in support of the control group test. See, 
e.g., Nath, supra note 12, at 39-40 ("How much of a shield is necessary - at a bare minimum 
- to accomplish the job of effectively guiding corporate legal decisionmaking") (footnote 
omitted). 
106. See, e.g., CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595 (1978); Kaplan, 
Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 883, 886-88 
(1976); Knauss, Corporate Governance -A Moving Target, 79 MICH. L. REv. 478, 487-500 
(1981). CJ. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928). 
107. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1978). See generally 
Burke, The JJuty of Co'!fidentiality and JJisclosing Corporate Misconduct, 36 Bus. LAW. 239, 
258-60 (1981). 
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the requirement furthers the purposes of the privilege, making any 
possible interference with the allocation of decision-making respon-
sibility of little consequence. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Supreme Court rejected the control group test in 
Upjohn, it declined to provide a standard for applying the attorney-
client privilege to corporations. In its wake remains continued un-
certainty for corporations and confusion for courts. The standards 
employed by the lower courts contain elements that frustrate the 
purposes of the privilege. 
·This Note argues that the courts should adopt the modified sub-
ject matter test with two further refinements. The first such modifi-
cation, which narrows the scope of the privilege, is the explicit 
adoption of Dean Wigmore's standard for the legal advice require-
ment. The second, which broadens the privilege's scope, is the elimi-
nation of the command requirement. Together these modifications 
shift the emphasis of the judicial inquiry from the communicant's 
status in the corporation to the purpose of the communication. This 
approach, it is submitted, produces results more consistent with the 
privilege's purposes. 
